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Justice Souter’s Religion Clause Jurisprudence: 
Judgments of Conscience 
RENÉ REYES 
Justice David Souter retired from the United States Supreme Court at 
the end of the 2008–2009 term.  Reflecting upon his legacy, a number of 
commentators have identified Souter’s joint opinion in Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey as his most noteworthy contribution to the Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence.  But beyond Casey, surprisingly few of Souter’s opinions 
have been identified as particularly remarkable or enduring.  This suggests 
that Justice Souter’s judicial legacy may have been rather modest—
perhaps owing to the fact that, as a member of the Court’s liberal minority, 
he was often in dissent in key cases. 
However, this Essay argues that Justice Souter’s legacy was 
potentially quite profound in at least one area of constitutional law: liberty 
of conscience under the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses.  During 
Souter’s tenure, the Supreme Court decided nearly two dozen cases 
involving significant Religion Clause issues.  Souter’s opinions in these 
cases reveal a commitment to protecting liberty of conscience that is 
notably more explicit and consistent than that of any other Justice 
currently sitting on the Court.  Moreover, to a degree that has been largely 
underappreciated, Justice Souter’s opinions are consistent with many of 
the most compelling historical and normative accounts of freedom of 
conscience that have been offered by liberal and conservative scholars 
alike.  Souter thus leaves behind a jurisprudential legacy that has the 
potential to lend intellectual and theoretical coherence to an area of law 
that has long been criticized for its inconsistency and internal tensions.   
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Justice Souter’s Religion Clause Jurisprudence: 
Judgments of Conscience 
RENÉ REYES* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Justice David Souter retired from the United States Supreme Court at 
the end of the 2008–2009 term.  Retirements, of course, are a natural 
occasion on which to reflect upon a justice’s legacy,1 and a number of legal 
scholars have begun to offer preliminary assessments of Souter’s nineteen 
years on the Court.  Several commentators have identified Souter’s opinion 
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey2—which was jointly authored with 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor—as his most noteworthy contribution to 
the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.3  For many conservatives, the 
Casey opinion is emblematic of Souter’s larger legacy as a “stealth 
liberal,” the appointment of whom was George H.W. Bush’s greatest 
mistake as president.4 
But beyond Casey, surprisingly few of Souter’s opinions have been 
identified as particularly noteworthy or enduring.  Indeed, when asked to 
comment on the significance of his years as a Justice, even many of 
Souter’s admirers have focused on his demeanor, intellectual rigor, and 
integrity rather than on his opinions in any specific cases or areas of the 
                                                                                                                          
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Villanova University School of Law.  A.B. Harvard College, J.D. 
Harvard Law School. 
1 The retirements of William Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Connor, for example, were followed 
by tributes in the Harvard Law Review, Stanford Law Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
Yale Law Journal, and many other journals.  E.g., Donald Ayer, Tribute, William H. Rehnquist: A Man 
for All Seasons, 115 YALE L. J. 1842 (2006); Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Address, Assessing Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1331 (2006); Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Tribute, A 
Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (2006); Symposium, Looking 
Backward, Looking Forward: The Legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 1661 (2006).  No doubt similar tributes to Justice Souter will be forthcoming. 
2 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (reaffirming the “essential holding” of Roe v. Wade, and recognizing 
“the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue 
interference from the State”). 
3 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Posting to The Judgment on Justice Souter, N.Y. TIMES ROOM  
FOR DEBATE BLOG (May 1, 2009, 6:19 PM), [hereinafter Judgment] 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/the-judgment-on-justice-souter/ (speculating that 
Souter’s most “notable” contribution may have been to convince Justices Kennedy and O’Connor not 
to overrule Roe in deciding Casey); Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Posting to Judgment, supra (noting that Casey 
was Souter’s most “memorable” opinion); Kermit Roosevelt, Posting to Judgment, supra (suggesting 
that the Casey opinion was Souter’s most “obvious” contribution to Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
4 See M. Edward Whelan III, Posting to Judgment, supra note 3 (“My guess is that Justice Souter 
will, in the end, be remembered most as President George H.W. Bush’s worst mistake.”).  
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law.5  This suggests that Justice Souter’s judicial legacy may have been 
rather modest—perhaps owing to the fact that, as a member of the Court’s 
liberal minority, he was often in dissent in key cases.6 
However, this Essay argues that Justice Souter’s legacy was potentially 
quite profound in at least one area of constitutional law: liberty of 
conscience under the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses.  This is not to 
say that Souter’s voice was the dominant one in Religion Clause 
controversies—after all, the Court decided nearly two dozen cases under 
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses during his tenure, and Souter 
wrote for the majority in only two of them.7  Nor did Souter offer an 
analytical framework for Religion Clause cases that has drawn as much 
judicial and scholarly attention as the three-part Lemon test8 or Justice 
O’Connor’s “endorsement” test.9  Nevertheless, Souter did write a total of 
fourteen opinions in Establishment and Free Exercise cases—many of 
them of considerable length and detail.10  A close examination of these 
opinions reveals a commitment to protecting liberty of conscience under 
both Religion Clauses that is more explicit and consistent than that of any 
other Justice currently sitting on the Court.  Moreover, to a degree that has 
been largely underappreciated, Justice Souter’s opinions are consistent 
with many of the most compelling historical and normative accounts of 
freedom of conscience that have been offered by liberal and conservative 
scholars alike.  Souter thus leaves behind a jurisprudential legacy that has 
the potential to lend intellectual and theoretical coherence to an area of law 
that has long been criticized for its inconsistency and internal tensions.   
                                                                                                                          
5 See Edward Lazarus, Posting to Judgment, supra note 3 (“His greatest contribution, however, 
lies not in any isolated set of opinions but in the intellectual rigor that he brought to the more liberal 
wing of a deeply divided Court.”); Powe, Posting to Judgment, supra note 3 (“Of the current nine, my 
favorite justice is retiring. . . .  He couldn’t be my favorite for what he wrote; he was my favorite for 
what he was. . . .  He was a judge, a man who in his confirmation hearings said he would listen and was 
telling the absolute truth.”); Orin Kerr, Posting to Judgment, supra note 3 (“Justice Souter’s main 
contribution has been as a thoughtful and intelligent member of the Supreme Court’s liberal voting  
bloc. . . .  Justice Souter’s most pronounced quality has been his integrity.  Justice Souter will long be 
remembered for the unmatched personal and intellectual integrity he brought to the Court.”). 
6 For a discussion of Justice Souter’s dissenting opinions, see infra Part II and notes 62, 68, and 
accompanying text. 
7 McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 544 U.S. 844 (2005); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. 
Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).  For a discussion of McCreary and Kiryas Joel, see infra 
notes 18, 28–30 and accompanying text.   
8 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (“First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.’” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 
(1970)). 
9 Justice O’Connor first developed the endorsement test in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984). 
10 For a discussion of Establishment and Free Exercise cases in which Justice Souter participated, 
see infra Part II. 
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II.  SOUTER’S JURISPRUDENCE IN RELIGION CLAUSE CASES 
Between Justice Souter’s confirmation in 1990 and his retirement in 
2009, the Supreme Court decided twenty-two cases that presented 
significant Religion Clause issues.11  Of these cases, seventeen primarily 
involved the Establishment Clause.12  Souter wrote for the majority in two 
of these cases, and filed concurring or dissenting opinions in ten others.  
Hence, there is an ample body of writing from which to discern Souter’s 
approach to Establishment Clause claims. 
The first Establishment Clause case in which Justice Souter 
participated was Lee v. Weisman.13  The case presented a challenge to 
prayers offered at a public high school graduation ceremony.14  Souter 
joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, which held that the prayers 
indirectly coerced students to participate in a religious observance and ran 
afoul of the State’s “duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable 
conscience and belief which is the mark of a free people.”15  However, 
Souter also wrote separately to address two questions left unresolved by 
the majority: “[W]hether the Clause applies to governmental practices that 
do not favor one religion or denomination over others, and whether state 
coercion of religious conformity, over and above state endorsement of 
religious exercise or belief, is a necessary element of an Establishment 
Clause violation.”16  Souter answered both questions emphatically in the 
negative.  In what would become a common practice in his Religion 
Clause opinions, Souter drew heavily on the writings of Madison and 
Jefferson and on the historical record surrounding the drafting of the First 
Amendment to argue for a more robust right to freedom of conscience than 
was explicitly recognized by the majority—a right that could be threatened 
even by non-preferential, non-coercive governmental endorsement of 
religion.17  
                                                                                                                          
11 This tally includes three cases which involved significant issues of religion but were not argued 
or decided under the Religion Clauses: Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) 
(discussed infra note 24); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 
(2006) (discussed infra note 68); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (discussed infra note 
68).  It does not include Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 
217 (2000), wherein a Free Exercise claim was initially raised but did not play a significant role in the 
Court’s majority opinion or in Justice Souter’s concurrence. 
12 For a discussion of the seventeen Establishment Clause cases, see infra Part II. 
13 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
14 Id. at 580. 
15 Id. at 592. 
16 Id. at 609. 
17 Given Souter’s position on non-preferential, non-coercive prayer in school settings, it is no 
surprise that he also joined the majority in subsequently striking down a district policy authorizing 
student-led prayers at high school football games.  Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 
(2000).  The majority noted that the district’s policy had “the improper effect of coercing those present 
to participate in an act of religious worship” and “empower[ed] the student body majority with the 
authority to subject students of minority views to constitutionally improper messages.”  Id. at 312, 316. 
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The concept of governmental endorsement of religion—and the related 
concept of governmental neutrality18—featured prominently in Justice 
Souter’s opinions in cases involving religious displays on public property.  
In the first such case to come before the Court during his tenure, Capitol 
Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, Souter concurred with the 
majority’s holding that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit a state 
from allowing a private group to display a Latin cross on statehouse 
grounds.19  But Souter wrote separately to emphasize that he would not 
recognize a per se rule permitting religious displays whenever they were 
privately sponsored and erected in a public forum; rather, he would 
continue to subject all such displays to the endorsement test.20  More 
specifically, he would ask whether “an intelligent observer would 
reasonably perceive private religious expression in a public forum to imply 
the government’s endorsement of religion.”21  Souter applied this same test 
late in his judicial career in a pair of cases involving displays of the Ten 
Commandments on government property: Van Orden v. Perry22 and 
McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky.23  The two cases were 
argued on the same day, but each was decided on its own facts.  Souter 
believed both displays to be unconstitutional; he found himself writing for 
the dissent in the first case and for the majority in the second.24   
In Van Orden, the challenged display was one of seventeen 
monuments spread throughout the twenty-two acres of the Texas State 
                                                                                                                          
18 Neutrality was also an important theme in Souter’s first majority opinion in a Religion Clause 
case.  See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 707 (1994) (stating that “it is 
clear that neutrality as among religions must be honored”).  There, the Court held that the creation of a 
school district along religious lines violated the Establishment Clause.  Writing for the Court, Souter 
explained that:  
The fundamental source of constitutional concern here is that the legislature itself 
may fail to exercise governmental authority in a religiously neutral way. The 
anomalously case-specific nature of the legislature’s exercise of state authority in 
creating this district for a religious community leaves the Court without any direct 
way to review such state action for the purpose of safeguarding a principle at the 
heart of the Establishment Clause, that government should not prefer one religion to 
another, or religion to irreligion.   
Id. at 703. 
19 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 783 (1995) (Souter, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).   
20 See id. at 784 (stating that the per se rule would be “an exception to the endorsement test, not 
previously recognized and out of square with our precedents”). 
21 Id. at 786. 
22 545 U.S. 677, 738 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
23 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005). 
24 The Court decided a third case involving religious displays during Souter’s final term on the 
bench, but evaluated the case solely on Free Speech grounds.  Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 
129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009) (holding that government was not required to permit a private religious 
group to install a religious monument in a public park where other private monuments had been 
accepted, because acceptance of such monuments constituted government speech not subject to the 
Free Speech Clause).  Justice Souter noted the potential for tension between the “recently minted” 
government speech doctrine and the Establishment Clause, but agreed that the present case was not the 
occasion to resolve such tensions.  Id. at 1141–42 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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Capitol grounds and was held by a majority of the Court to constitute a 
permissible acknowledgment of the role played by the Ten 
Commandments in American history.25  Souter’s dissent argued that the 
majority’s holding violated the general rule of government neutrality 
toward religion mandated by the Establishment Clause: “If neutrality in 
religion means something, any citizen should be able to visit [his] civic 
home without having to confront religious expressions clearly meant to 
convey an official religious position that may be at odds with his own 
religion, or with rejection of religion.”26  In Souter’s view, the lack of a 
common theme among the other monuments on the grounds meant that a 
reasonable observer would take each display on its own terms—and in 
light of both the history of the Decalogue itself and the details of the Texas 
monument, any reasonable observer would understand “that the 
government of Texas is telling everyone who sees the monument to live up 
to a moral code because God requires it . . . .”27  Similarly, in his majority 
opinion in McCreary, Souter emphasized that the purpose behind 
courthouse displays of the Ten Commandments would be evaluated with 
reference to “‘an objective observer,’ one who takes account of the 
traditional external signs that show up in the ‘text, legislative history, and 
implementation of the statute’ or comparable official act.”28  The history in 
this case showed that the defendant counties had a religious purpose in 
displaying the Commandments, and a reasonable observer would 
“probably suspect that the Counties were simply reaching for any way to 
keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses constitutionally 
required to embody religious neutrality.”29 
Souter’s guiding principle in these cases is that government must 
remain neutral with respect to religion because religious belief “is reserved 
for the conscience of the individual.”30  He cites the arguments of Madison 
and Jefferson against “employing Religion as an engine of Civil policy”31 
and against official support for religion—a practice which “degrades from 
                                                                                                                          
25 However, there was no majority opinion: Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for himself and Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 680 (plurality opinion), while Justice Breyer 
wrote separately and concurred in the result only.  Id. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  
The plurality opinion declined to apply either the Lemon test or the endorsement test and instead 
focused on “the nature of the monument and . . . our Nation’s history.”  Id. at 686 (plurality opinion).  
Breyer’s concurring opinion acknowledged that no single test could neatly resolve the case, but 
nevertheless focused on the primary effect and message that the monument conveyed.  Breyer also 
placed emphasis on the fact that the monument had stood unchallenged for some forty years, and 
expressed concern that its forced removal would suggest hostility to religion and promote the kind of 
religious divisiveness the Establishment Clause was meant to avoid.  Id. at 702–04 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
26 Id. at 745–46 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
27 Id. at 739–40.   
28 545 U.S. at 862 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985)). 
29 Id. at 873. 
30 Id. at 881. 
31 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 737. 
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the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend 
to those of the Legislative authority.”32  Neutrality thus serves both to 
guard against civic divisiveness and to protect the integrity of the 
individual’s conscience by preventing the government from taking sides in 
matters of religious opinion.33 
To an even greater extent than in the context of religious displays on 
public property, Justice Souter frequently invoked Madison, Jefferson, and 
liberty of conscience in the context of government funding for religious 
activity.  In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,34  
for example, the Court held that public funding of an evangelical student 
newspaper’s printing costs was consistent with the Establishment Clause—
and that the denial of such funding amounted to viewpoint discrimination 
in violation of the Free Speech Clause.35  In a vigorous dissent, Souter 
argued that “[u]sing public funds for the direct subsidization of preaching 
the word is categorically forbidden under the Establishment Clause, and if 
the Clause was meant to accomplish nothing else, it was meant to bar this 
use of public money.”36  Souter supported his argument with extensive 
citations to Madison.  In particular, Souter focused on Madison’s Memorial 
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, comparing the student 
activities fees that funded the religious newspaper to the religious taxes 
that were the subject of Madison’s Remonstrance.37  Although he did not 
explicitly frame his dissent in the language of liberty of conscience, Souter 
clearly understood the case to present a threat to conscientious freedom—
for “[w]ho does not see that . . . the same authority which can force a 
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any 
one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in 
all cases whatsoever?”38 
The connection between public expenditures in support of religion and 
liberty of conscience was suggested again in Souter’s opinion in Agostini v. 
Felton.39  Dissenting from the majority’s decision permitting New York 
City’s Board of Education to send public school teachers into religious 
schools to provide remedial education, Souter maintained that the 
Establishment Clause imposes an “unwavering rule” against such 
subsidization of religious education.40  The reasons for this rule are 
                                                                                                                          
32 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 878. 
33 Id. at 875–76. 
34 515 U.S. 819 (1995).   
35 Id. at 845–46. 
36 Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
37 Id. at 868–73. 
38 Id. at 868 (omissions in Rosenberger) (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance 
Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1947) 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting)). 
39 521 U.S. 203, 243 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
40 Id.  
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twofold: government support for religion has the potential to limit the 
freedom of the supported faith, and also to compromise religious freedom 
for members of dissenting faiths.41  
While liberty of conscience was thus an implicit theme for Souter in 
Rosenberger and Agostini, it became explicit in several cases that 
followed.  Two of these cases again involved public aid for religious 
education; a third involved expenditure of public funds to promote “faith-
based initiatives.”42  The first education case was Mitchell v. Helms,43  
involving an as-applied challenge to a program under which federal funds 
were distributed to local agencies in Louisiana, which in turn lent 
educational materials to private religious schools.44  Although no opinion 
commanded the support of more than four Justices, a majority of the Court 
agreed that the program was consistent with the Establishment Clause.45   
Justice Souter dissented and argued once more that the program at issue 
ran afoul of the Establishment Clause’s bar against use of public funds in 
support of religion.  This bar serves several important ends: “to guarantee 
the right of individual conscience against compulsion, to protect the 
integrity of religion against the corrosion of secular support, and to 
preserve the unity of political society against the implied exclusion of the 
less favored and the antagonism of controversy over public support for 
religious causes.”46  With respect to liberty of conscience in particular, 
“Madison’s and Jefferson’s now familiar words establish clearly that 
liberty of personal conviction requires freedom from coercion to support 
religion, and this means that the government can compel no aid to fund 
it.”47  Coherence in Religion Clause jurisprudence would be possible only 
                                                                                                                          
41 Id. at 243–44.  Justice Souter’s concern with liberty of conscience in the school context was 
also apparent in his dissenting opinion in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 
(2001).  In Good News Club, the majority held that the Free Speech Clause required, and the 
Establishment Clause permitted, a school to give a children’s church group equal access to school 
property after hours.  Id. at 119–20.  Souter dissented from the Court’s Free Speech analysis, and from 
its decision to even reach the Establishment Clause question (which was not addressed by either the 
trial or appellate courts below).  Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting).  But while Souter would not have 
decided the Establishment Clause issue, he nevertheless emphasized the fact that “Good News intends 
to use the public school premises not for the mere discussion of a subject from a particular, Christian 
point of view, but for an evangelical service of worship calling children to commit themselves in an act 
of Christian conversion.”  Id. at 138.  He further emphasized the vulnerability of children’s 
consciences, noting that “Establishment Clause cases have consistently recognized the particular 
impressionability of schoolchildren . . . and the special protection required for those in the elementary 
grades in the school forum.”  Id. at 142–43 (internal citations omitted).  Thus, even on the limited 
record before the Court, there was reason to conclude that “Good News’s exercises blur the line 
between public classroom instruction and private religious indoctrination, leaving a reasonable 
elementary school pupil unable to appreciate that the former instruction is the business of the school 
while the latter evangelism is not.”  Id. at 144–45. 
42 See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found. Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 592 (2007). 
43 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000). 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 835, 867. 
46 Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
47 Id. at 870. 
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if the Court kept these fundamental principles in mind. 
Souter returned to this theme in the Cleveland school voucher case, 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.48  There, the majority rejected an 
Establishment Clause challenge to an Ohio program that provided families 
with vouchers that could be spent at any participating public or private 
school, notwithstanding the fact that ninety-six percent of students used the 
vouchers to pay tuition at religiously-affiliated institutions.49  Justice 
Souter devoted the first half of his dissenting opinion to an extensive 
analysis of the Court’s Establishment Clause precedent, from Everson v. 
Board of Education of Ewing50 through Mitchell.51  Souter criticized the 
majority for ignoring Everson and misapplying the standards set forth in 
more recent cases—indeed, he viewed the majority’s departure from 
precedent to be so extreme as to constitute “doctrinal bankruptcy.”52   
But Souter’s dissent did not focus on application of precedent alone.  
To the contrary, even if he were to assume “arguendo that the majority’s 
formal criteria were satisfied on the facts,” Souter would have found the 
majority’s conclusion to be “profoundly at odds with the Constitution.”53  
Specifically—and as emphasized in his previous opinions—Souter would 
have found any scheme of public support for religion to be inconsistent 
with the history and purpose of the Establishment Clause.  Enlisting the 
support of Madison and Jefferson once more, Souter argued that “every 
objective underlying the prohibition of religious establishment is betrayed 
by this scheme . . . the first being respect for freedom of conscience.”54  To 
be sure, the Ohio program also posed threats to the independence of the 
religious schools and to religious and social harmony.  Nevertheless, the 
threat to freedom of conscience remains an object of particular attention in 
Souter’s opinions—perhaps because “[a]s a historical matter, the 
protection of liberty of conscience may well have been the central 
objective served by the Establishment Clause.”55 
The final funding case in which Souter explicitly emphasized the 
centrality of liberty of conscience under the Religion Clauses was Hein v. 
Freedom From Religion Foundation., Inc.56  The case presented an 
Establishment Clause challenge to the use of government funds to promote 
President George W. Bush’s faith-based initiatives program.57  However, 
the majority held that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit; the Court 
                                                                                                                          
48 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
49 Id. at 647, 662. 
50 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
51 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
52 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 688 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. at 707–08. 
54 Id. at 711. 
55 Id. at 711 n.22. 
56 551 U.S. 587, 637 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 592 (plurality opinion). 
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accordingly declined to reach the merits of the Establishment Clause 
claim.58  In his dissent, Souter again argued that the “very extraction and 
spending of tax money in aid of religion” constitutes an injury to the 
conscience.59  Nor is this kind of harm a mere “[p]sychic [i]njury” that 
amounts to little more than disagreement with government policy—it is 
rather an injury that has “deep historical roots going back to the ideal of 
religious liberty in James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessments.”60  In sum, “[t]he right of conscience and the 
expenditure of an identifiable three pence raised by taxes for the support of 
a religious cause are . . . not to be split off from one another.”61  It therefore 
made no difference to Souter whether the expenditure was made by the 
Executive or by the Legislature—for the injury to liberty of conscience 
would be equally real in either instance. 
Promoting liberty of conscience was thus a consistent theme in Justice 
Souter’s opinions in Establishment Clause cases.  Some critics—both on 
the bench and in academia—have suggested that Souter’s opinions in these 
cases may reflect a hostility to religion or a commitment to an overly-rigid 
“separation” of church and state.62  But these criticisms give insufficient 
weight to Souter’s oft-expressed commitment to accommodating religious 
activity.  Beginning with the first opinion he wrote in an Establishment 
Clause case, Souter left no doubt that government may lift discernible 
burdens on religious practice: “The State may ‘accommodate’ the free 
exercise of religion by relieving people from generally applicable rules that 
interfere with their religious callings.”63  In other words, Souter did not 
invoke liberty of conscience simply to defend the rights of the secular; he 
also invoked it to promote the rights of the religious. 
                                                                                                                          
58 Plaintiffs asserted standing as taxpayers under the rule recognized in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 
83 (1968).  The Court held that Flast recognized taxpayer standing only in cases where funds were 
spent pursuant to a specific Congressional authorization; it did not grant standing where—as here—the 
funds were spent out of general Executive Branch appropriations.  Hein, 551 U.S at 593.  
59 Hein, 551 U.S. at 638 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60 Id. at 638–39 (italics added).  
61 Id. at 638. 
62 For instance, in his McCreary dissent, Justice Scalia criticizes Souter’s majority opinion for 
“ratchet[ing] up the Court’s hostility to religion.”  McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 
900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In a similar vein, Justice Thomas suggests that Souter’s dissenting 
opinion in Mitchell “reserve[s] special hostility for those who take their religion seriously.”  Mitchell v. 
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 827 (2000); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN 
DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 298 (2008) (noting that “vestiges of 
separationism” are discernible in Justice Souter’s thought). 
63 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 627 (1992) (internal citation omitted); see also Bd. of Educ. of 
Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (“[T]he Constitution allows the State 
to accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens.  Our cases leave no doubt that in 
commanding neutrality the Religion Clauses do not require the government to be oblivious to 
impositions that legitimate exercises of state power may place on religious belief and practice.”).  
Souter also joined the majority in holding that the heightened protections for prisoners’ religious rights 
provided by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) 
(2000), were consistent with the Establishment Clause.  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005). 
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Nor was Justice Souter’s acknowledgement of the rights of believers 
mere dicta offered to soften the rhetoric of his opinions in Establishment 
Clause cases.  To the contrary, Souter’s commitment to protecting the 
conscientious rights of religious individuals is a dominant theme in his 
opinions in the few Free Exercise cases decided by the Court during his 
tenure.  Souter’s most extensive such opinion was a concurrence in Church 
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, in which the Court held that a 
facially-neutral local ordinance was intended to suppress a particular 
religious practice and was therefore void under the Free Exercise Clause.64  
Souter agreed with the Court’s holding, but disagreed with its reference to 
the rule announced in Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith that a generally-applicable law which has the 
unintended effect of prohibiting religious practice does not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause.65  Indeed, Souter expressed “doubts about whether the 
Smith rule merits adherence,”66 and noted that “our common notion of 
neutrality is broad enough to cover . . . what might be called substantive 
neutrality, which, in addition to demanding a secular object, would 
generally require government to accommodate religious differences by 
exempting religious practices from formally neutral laws.”67  While much 
of the language of Souter’s analysis is framed in terms of government 
neutrality rather than liberty of conscience, the implication of his analysis 
would clearly offer much greater protection for religious conscience than 
was granted by the majority.68 
                                                                                                                          
64 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993). 
65 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
66 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 559 (Souter, J., concurring). 
67 Id. at 561–62.   
68 Justice Souter reiterated his doubts about the merits of the Smith rule in City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  The case presented a challenge to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”)—a piece of Congressional legislation that was intended to overturn Smith and to restore the 
“compelling interest” test as the governing rule for Free Exercise claims.  Id. at 511.  The Court held 
that enforcement of RFRA against the states was beyond Congress’s power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in part because the statute attempted to change the meaning of “free exercise” as defined 
by the Court.  See id. at 534 (“Laws valid under Smith would fall under RFRA without regard to 
whether they had the object of stifling or punishing free exercise.  We make these observations not to 
reargue the position of the majority in Smith but to illustrate the substantive alteration of its holding 
attempted by RFRA.”).  In dissent, Souter argued that the uncertainty surrounding the precedential 
value of Smith prevented a sound analysis of RFRA’s constitutionality, and that the instant case should 
be set down for plenary re-examination of the Free Exercise issues.  Id. at 565–66 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
Despite the holding in Boerne, RFRA remains valid as applied against the federal government.  
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006).  In O 
Centro, the Court unanimously applied RFRA’s compelling interest test in upholding a challenge to the 
federal government’s ban on hoasca, a hallucinogenic tea used in religious ceremonies.  The case 
presented no constitutional challenges to RFRA, and was decided on purely statutory grounds.  See id. 
at 423 (noting that challenge was based “on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which 
prohibits the Federal Government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion, unless 
the Government demonstrates that application of the burden to the person represents the least restrictive 
means of advancing a compelling government interest” and concluding that “the Government has not 
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Liberty of conscience was thus a consistent and unifying principle in 
Justice Souter’s opinions in cases arising under both Religion Clauses.  In 
Establishment Clause cases, Souter invoked Madison’s and Jefferson’s 
writings on liberty of conscience to argue against government sponsorship 
of religious activity through taxation, government endorsement of religion 
through the placement of religious symbols on public property, or 
government support of religious belief through prayer in school settings.  
In Free Exercise Clause cases, Souter again invoked the Framers to argue 
against rules that would limit the freedom of religious individuals to act in 
accordance with their conscientious beliefs.  To be sure, Souter also 
emphasized other constitutional values in his Religion Clause opinions; 
maintaining government neutrality, protecting religion from government 
interference, and minimizing religious conflict are important examples.  
But none of these values are inconsistent with a strong theory of liberty of 
conscience; they simply lend such a theory additional support.  
III.  SOUTER’S JURISPRUDENCE AND RELIGION CLAUSE SCHOLARSHIP 
Justice Souter’s emphasis on liberty of conscience in his Establishment 
and Free Exercise jurisprudence finds ample support in the academic 
literature—for a number of scholars have convincingly argued that 
protecting liberty of conscience was one of the central purposes behind the 
Religion Clauses.  Perhaps most prominently, Noah Feldman and Michael 
McConnell have written thoroughgoing accounts of the role of liberty of 
conscience in the origins of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.  
With respect to the Establishment Clause, Noah Feldman has argued that  
“[i]n the time between the proposal of the Constitution and of the Bill of 
Rights, the predominant, not to say exclusive, argument against established 
churches was that they had the potential to violate liberty of conscience.”69  
Michael McConnell has likewise maintained that a strong right to liberty of 
conscience was part of the original understanding of the Free Exercise 
Clause, and that this understanding arguably included a right to some 
conscientious exemptions from generally applicable laws.70   
                                                                                                                          
carried the burden expressly placed on it by Congress in the . . . Act” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
69 Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 
398 (2002) [hereinafter Feldman, Intellectual Origins]. 
70 See Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of 
Conscience?: A Critique of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 819, 831 (1998) [hereinafter McConnell, Rights of Conscience] (reviewing the 
intellectual and constitutional context in which the First Amendment was drafted, and concluding that 
“this history supports the view that impositions on religious conscience may be enforced only if they 
serve the fundamental interests of the state”); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1512 (1990) [hereinafter 
McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding] (acknowledging that “the historical evidence is 
limited and in some points mixed,” but concluding that a “doctrine of free exercise exemptions is more 
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Notably, however, Souter’s approach to liberty of conscience does not 
neatly track either of these scholarly theories of the Religion Clauses.  
Rather, Souter’s approach is consistent with some of the strongest 
arguments advanced in each theory, but also departs from some of the 
elements of each theory that are most open to criticism.  Consider Noah 
Feldman’s arguments about the history and interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause.  Professor Feldman marshals considerable historical 
evidence to support the claim that liberty of conscience underlay objections 
to religious establishments in the Founding Era.  Feldman demonstrates 
that compelled support of religious ministers was understood by many 
dissenters to violate liberty of conscience, and argues that Madison’s case 
against the Virginia Assessment Bill was heavily influenced by Lockean 
ideals of conscientious liberty.71  In sum, Feldman concludes that although 
there was “a live disagreement about whether nonpreferential funding of 
religion necessarily violated liberty of conscience,” there was nevertheless 
“broad agreement in late-eighteenth-century America that liberty of 
conscience was the key value that ought to inform any discussion of church 
and state.”72 
Up to this point, Souter’s approach to Establishment Clause 
controversies is consistent with and draws support from Feldman’s 
historical analysis: Souter repeatedly argues that taxpayer-funded support 
for religion violated liberty of conscience, and he even cites Feldman in 
support of this proposition.73  However, Souter’s opinions do not follow 
the interpretive approach suggested in some of Feldman’s more recent 
work.  For Feldman also argues that the Supreme Court should reject the 
“secular purpose” and “endorse[ment]” tests in Establishment Clause cases 
and replace those tests with a “no coercion and no money” standard.74  
Under this analytical framework, the Court would be more vigilant about 
prohibiting public expenditures in support of religion and religious activity.  
But at the same time, the Court would be more accommodating of religion 
and religious symbolism in public life, provided that no coercion was 
involved.  This approach would seem to allow greater room for such things 
as public displays of the Ten Commandments and for prayers at school 
football games and graduations75—practices to which Souter strenuously 
                                                                                                                          
consistent with the original understanding than is a position that leads only to the facial neutrality of 
legislation”). 
71 See Feldman, Intellectual Origins, supra note 69, at 383–84 (highlighting Lockean elements in 
Madison’s objections to the Assessment Bill and noting that “[l]iberty of conscience was the dominant 
theoretical framework for Madison’s argument against establishment”). 
72 Id. at 397–98. 
73 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
74 NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE 
SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 237 (2005). 
75 See Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 72–74 (2007) 
(noting ambiguity in Feldman’s understanding of “coercion,” and exploring possibility that Feldman’s 
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objected.  Given its “decidedly contrarian”76 implications, it is perhaps not 
surprising that Feldman’s proposed interpretive model has been met with 
some skepticism in the academic literature.77 
Justice Souter’s jurisprudence is similarly consistent with many of the 
most compelling arguments set forth in Michael McConnell’s analysis of 
the origins of the Free Exercise Clause.  Like Professor Feldman, Professor 
McConnell argues that the Framers of the Religion Clauses were strongly 
influenced by John Locke’s ideas about liberty of conscience.78  However, 
McConnell also emphasizes that the Framers went well beyond Locke in 
protecting conscientious liberty—for while Locke insisted that 
conscientious objectors were not entitled to exemptions from generally 
applicable laws,79 the historical evidence suggests that the Framers 
intended to permit such exemptions in at least some cases.80  Souter noted 
the potential relevance of this history—and McConnell’s work in 
particular—in expressing doubts about the soundness of Smith and in 
urging the Court to reconsider the case’s holding.81 
Nevertheless, it is not clear that Justice Souter was prepared to accept 
all of Professor McConnell’s arguments.  Perhaps most significantly, 
McConnell’s reading of constitutional history indicates that religious 
claims of conscience are entitled to greater protection and accommodation 
than secular claims of conscience.  McConnell supports this reading by 
noting that the First Congress rejected an earlier formulation of the 
Religion Clauses that mentioned “rights of conscience” and instead 
adopted the language of “free exercise of religion.”82  McConnell further 
notes that “[t]he textual insistence on the special status of ‘religion’ is, 
moreover, rooted in the prevailing understandings, both religious and 
philosophical, of the difference between religious faith and other forms of 
                                                                                                                          
approach might allow for “displays like Nativity scenes and Ten Commandments monuments” and for 
“school-sponsored prayer . . . at special events like graduations”).   
76 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 
456 (2008). 
77 CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 152–56 (2007); GREENAWALT, supra note 76, at 456–61; Laycock, supra note 75, at 
68–80. 
78 See McConnell, Origins and Original Understanding, supra note 70, at 1431 (“Locke’s  
ideas . . . are [an] indispensable part of the intellectual backdrop for the framing of the free exercise 
clause.”). 
79 See id. at 1430–35 (analyzing Locke’s theory of religious toleration and concluding that it 
“expressly precludes free exercise exemptions”). 
80 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
81 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 574–75 (Souter, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that “when the opportunity to reexamine 
Smith presents itself, we may consider recent scholarship raising serious questions about the Smith 
rule’s consonance with the original understanding and purpose of the Free Exercise Clause”). 
82 See McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 70, at 1488–1500 
(maintaining that Congress’s ultimate choice of words is “of utmost importance,” and explaining the 
interpretive implications of this choice). 
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human judgment.”83  These understandings held that religious duties took 
precedence over all other duties, insofar as religious duties were owed to a 
higher power (i.e., God) than the civil government.  McConnell argues that 
it is only these religious duties that are entitled to exemption and 
accommodation: “Unbelievers undoubtedly make judgments of right and 
wrong that sometimes conflict with generally applicable law.  But if these 
do not stem from obedience to a transcendent authority prior to and beyond 
the authority of civil government, they do not receive exemption under the 
free exercise clause.”84   
In short, one of McConnell’s main scholarly theses “is that ‘singling 
out religion’ for special constitutional protection is fully consistent with 
our constitutional tradition.”85  But however accurate McConnell’s thesis 
may be as a reflection of original constitutional understanding, it is highly 
debatable as a standard for contemporary constitutional interpretation.   
Two of the most prominent opponents of special privileges for religion are 
Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager.  In their recent and much-
discussed book, Eisgruber and Sager argue that there is “no constitutional 
reason to treat religion as deserving special benefits or as subject to special 
disabilities.”86  Instead, religious claims should be evaluated under the 
theory of “equal liberty.”87  This theory “demands that all persons—
whether engaged in religiously inspired enterprises or not—enjoy rights of 
free speech, personal autonomy, associative freedom, and private property 
that, while neither uniquely relevant to religion nor defined in terms of 
religion, will allow religious practice to flourish.”88  Kent Greenawalt has 
similarly argued that “constitutional considerations of equality” require 
that secular claims of conscience be treated equally with religious claims, 
“at least when claims of nonreligious conscience are common and can be 
feasibly assessed by a screening process.”89 
As noted above, it is by no means clear that Justice Souter would have 
agreed with McConnell’s claim that religion should be “singled out” for 
special protection.  It seems rather more likely that his favorable citation of 
McConnell’s writings on Free Exercise reflected Souter’s view that 
government should lift “discernible burden[s]” on religious practice when 
secular rules have been drawn without taking those burdens into account.90  
“In such circumstances, accommodating religion reveals nothing beyond a 
                                                                                                                          
83 Id. at 1496. 
84 Id. at 1500. 
85 Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 
(2000). 
86 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 77, at 52.   
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 52–53. 
89 Kent Greenawalt, Diverse Perspectives and the Religion Clauses: An Examination of 
Justifications and Qualifying Beliefs, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1433, 1473 (1999).  
90 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 629 (Souter, J., concurring).  
 2010] SOUTER’S RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 319 
recognition that general rules can unnecessarily offend the religious 
conscience when they offend the conscience of secular society not at all.”91  
This approach does not imply that religious believers should be given 
special privileges as a matter of constitutional law.  Instead, it merely 
implies that religious believers should be given “equal regard” in the 
lawmaking process, and that government should “exempt religious 
observers from burdens that are not shared fairly with others.”92  As this 
Essay has attempted to show, such equal regard for the consciences of 
religious and secular Americans was one of the hallmarks of Souter’s 
Religion Clause jurisprudence. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Justice Souter leaves behind a legacy of Religion Clause opinions that 
expresses a consistent commitment to protecting liberty of conscience.  
Under the Establishment Clause, this commitment was reflected in 
Souter’s unwavering opposition to public funding for religious activity, 
and in his steadfast objection to government endorsement of religious 
belief—even if such endorsement was non-preferential and non-coercive.  
In Free Exercise cases, Souter’s solicitude for liberty of conscience was 
equally evident in his insistence that government could accommodate 
religion by lifting discernible burdens on religious practice.   
While Souter himself acknowledged that interpretation of the Religion 
Clauses has “defied any simple test,”93 his emphasis on liberty of 
conscience nevertheless has the potential to lend intellectual and 
theoretical coherence to Religion Clause jurisprudence.  As demonstrated 
above, recent scholarship has shown that protecting liberty of conscience 
was one of the primary goals behind both the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses.  Souter’s jurisprudential legacy draws upon these 
original understandings of the Religion Clauses, while also reflecting 
contemporary commitments to equal liberty for believers and nonbelievers 
alike.   
 
                                                                                                                          
91 Id. at 628. 
92 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 77, at 87. 
93 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
